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ABSTRACT
Organizations incorporate changes in technological capabilities and patterns of work
slowly and with great difficulty. Similar to the introduction of electricity in the early
1990s, information technology's benefits were not realized until competition forced private
companies to adapt their organizational structure and operating practices to take
advantage of new capabilities. They sought to change the very nature of work, not just do
work faster
A decreasing defense budget forces the Navy to face many of the common problems
overcome earlier in the world of private industry. This initial exploration identifies
potential opportunities to be gained by taking a business perspective in the integration of
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I. THE INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Many of the productivity gains achieved in private industry during the past decade
continue to elude the Navy's surface fleet. Commercial organizations have been forced by
competition to integrate information technology (IT) into the business process, thereby
reducing the work force while increasing productivity Faced with increasing international
commitments, a decreasing defense budget and a smaller surface fleet, the Navy must take
a business perspective in integrating information technology in the evolution to smaller,
more capable, less manpower-intensive surface ships.
A. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY
Private companies solve modern problems using information technology however and
wherever profitable. Through organization redesign, human resource policies and the
growing capabilities of IT, they reengineer to compete—effectively reaping the benefits of
new capabilities in information technology.
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE NAVY
The military also uses new technology throughout the services, but with less dramatic
results. The procurement and support of IT systems make up the largest item in the
capital spending budget of the Department of Defense: 9.8 billion dollars in the 1993
budget allocation The Navy invested much of this money in the installation of computer
systems on ships, to perform functions that the crew had previously performed However,
the Navy has not yet taken full advantage of the capabilities these new technologies
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provide, largely because it contracted for systems designed to fit the existing surface fleet's
organizational structure, operating procedures and practices. System development
methodologies did not challenge many existing practices, particularly on surface ships.
While they automated many manual procedures, they failed to reduce the number of
onboard personnel.
The designers and developers of new ships and of ship systems personnel largely
overlooked the broad view of a surface ship's mission—and the factors leading to
successful mission accomplishment—as related to potential information technology
systems. In the absence of this broader perspective, the new systems they adopted simply
rivet into place the long-established methods of conducting operations, making change
ever more difficult.
C. THE INFLUENCE OF COMPETITION
Why has productivity improved and the number of employees been cut so drastically
in private industry (especially shipping), while the Defense Department allocates such a
large percentage of its annual budget to IT without the same degree of cost savings in
manpower? One factor influencing this phenomenon may be competition. Fierce
domestic and growing international competition force manufacturers to change their
organizational structures and work procedures in order to achieve the highest quality
output for any given input, with little room for poor performance, quality, or productivity.
As capabilities of information technology grew, the private sector drastically altered the
way information system employees worked.
D. PRIVATE INDUSTRY'S EARLY PROBLEMS
The benefits of using new technologies at first evaded even the most progressive
companies Many simply bought new systems, cut the payroll and loaded the work on the
survivors. (Levinson, 1994 p. 49) Modern downsizing dramatically differs from the
slash-and-burn tactics of the 1970s and 1980s Companies are "combing their businesses
from top to bottom to eliminate tasks and procedures that don't bring profit " (Levinson,
1994, p. 49)
Researchers found a parallel in the productivity slump that occurred in the early part of
this century. By 1919 most U. S. factories had moved from steam to electricity, yet
productivity had not improved since the 1890s
New electric equipment was installed at a rapid pace, but it typically just replaced
older machines in the existing, formerly steam-driven factories with their old and
inefficient layouts. Productivity soon jumped, however, as businesses built new
factories and redesigned their shop floor layouts and work steps to take advantage
of electricity and electric motors.
(Schnitt, 1993, p. 16)
Those organizational and process changes greatly improved efficiency and effectiveness
Similarly, today's companies use computers and new information systems to change the
very nature of work, not just to do work faster
In the move to larger, electrically-powered manufacturing during the early 1 900s,
private industry adopted a hierarchical organizational structure similar to those used by the
military They called their adapted version "scientific management." These larger
companies stressed management over the many by the few through efficiency and control.
Managers designed tasks to the lowest level of skill possible. Engineers and consultants
conducted time-and-motion studies, determining the time allowed for each task and the
steps needed to complete it. A growing bureaucratic hierarchy took information from the
workers, sending it up and down the chain of command through departments organized
functionally. Layers of management summarized work progress and performance factors,
sending these reports higher up the chain until they reached decision makers. Top
managers made decisions, communicating them down the hierarchy to the lowest level for
implementation In 1994—nearly a century later—surface ships continue to use the same
method, as they have for centuries.
E. REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY
As technology changed and more efficient means of coordination emerged,
competition forced private companies to examine their business and management
processes and adopt new ones that improved efficiency—or go out of business. "American
manufacturers in the 1970s and 1980s woke up to increased competition from abroad."
(Schnitt, 1993, p 17) They found themselves deficient in the competition for quality,
customer service, speed, innovation and cost Their competitors produced goods faster,
cheaper and of better quality, often employing fewer people for the same amount of work
(Schnitt, 1993, p. 18)
Private companies modified the way they did business in order to survive radical
change. With a new perspective they began examining their business processes, moving
away from separate departments and multiple layers of management For example, faced
with huge operating losses and intense foreign competition, Ford Motor Company
examined many areas of its operations. In its supply procurement division Ford employed
over 500 personnel, generating reams of paperwork that contained many inventory
discrepancies and billing errors. Mazda Motors in Japan performed the same function
better with five employees. (Schnitt, 1993, p. 19) The competition forced Ford to adopt
new methods using modern information technology. Instead of pieces of information
moving through different departments, the supply personnel entered the invoice once, with
verification performed by the workers receiving the supplies By reengineering the
process Ford reduced the division's personnel by 75%, while dramatically improving the
speed, cost and quality of the process. (Schnitt, 1993, p 19)
Companies found that work performed by different people as a series of separate steps
led to poor quality, an absence of accountability and employees' inability to sense the big
picture and overall goals of the organization. Comparing themselves to the competition,
these old-style companies realized their relatively poor performance. With customers
demanding better products and services, many companies reengineered
"Reengineering can be defined as the reorganization of the organization, its way of
conducting business and its information technologies to attain better overall performance."
(Sprague and McNurlin, 1993, p. 82) The process of business reengineering involves
redesigning work to capitalize on the technical and employee changes evolving since the
days of scientific management. Today's work force contains a higher percentage of well
trained, educated employees who are knowledgeable and experienced enough to perform
their work and make decisions traditionally reserved for higher- level management. The
evolution in information technology allows multiple users instant access to information
and cooperation with others in ongoing work without the coordination of upper
management.
F. DOLLARS DICTATE CHANGE IN THE SURFACE FLEET
The way we generally operate our organization is by cloning. Now if you clone,
you can't change and can't adapt. Today we don't need clones. We need change.
(VADM Kalleres, 1994)
The leadership of the Navy's surface fleet doesn't need to look far to see the need for
change. With a decreasing Defense budget and its impact throughout the military, new
approaches are being undertaken to provide for the nation's defense at a lower cost
without decreasing readiness. By 1999, the Navy plans to reduce active-duty forces by
170,000 enlisted and 20,000 officers, while cutting up to 185 surface ships compared to
the Navy of 1989. (Force 2001, 1993, p. 37) William Kaufmann, a respected military
analyst at the Brookings Institution, believes the 1993 military budget of $276 billion
could drop as low as $182 billion in 1993-adjusted dollars by 1997 (Ratan, 1993, p. 92)
G. A KEY FEATURE OF THE NAVY'S COST REDUCTION PLANS
All of the leading cost-reduction plans being considered share a common feature the
reduction in active-duty ships is being offset by an increase in Military Sealift Command
vessels. The increases proposed go as high as 61 vessels by 1997, there are 33 in service
today. (Ratan, 1993, p. 93) The reason for replacing active-duty ships with primarily
civilian-manned ones is simple: These ships provide nearly the same capability in sealift,
resupply and refueling at a greatly reduced cost The Military Sealift Command integrated
information technology into their ship operations and changed their organizational
structure to take advantage of the new capabilities Not unlike the American auto industry
of the 1980s, this part of the surface Navy is being replaced by a lower cost and better
service provider.
II. YESTERDAY'S FLEET CAN'T COMPETE: TRADITIONAL
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION OF A U. S. NAVY SURFACE
SHIP
A. ORIGINS OF THE ORGANIZATION
One reason why the Navy's surface fleet is no longer competitive in meeting service
needs lies in the continued use of an outmoded organizational structure. The roots of the
current surface ship's organizational structure stretch back over two hundred and fifty
years, to the British navy and the age of the Industrial Revolution. Inefficiency and
ineffectiveness arise from applying ancient, sail and mechanical-age principles to the new
possibilities provided by Information Age technologies.
The command and control structure ofNavy surface ships today resembles those of
manufacturing firms in the first half of the twentieth century. A Commanding Officer,
with the assistance of an Executive Officer, heads the organization which is made up of
officer and enlisted specialists broken into different departments, divisions, and work
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Standard Surface Ship Organizational Structure
Figure 1 (OPNAVINST 3120.32B, 1986, p. 2-3)
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This organizational structure is no longer the most appropriate .... Self-managed
groups provide much of their own management, have lower absenteeism, higher yield
productivity, produce higher quality work, and are more motivated than workers in
traditional settings
(Sprague and McNurlin, 1993, p 13)
B. SHIP CONTROL AND NAVIGATION
The center of an underway surface ship's command and control structure during
peacetime steaming is the Officer of the Deck. OPNAVINST 3 120.32B lists this officer's
eighteen primary duties during the normal four-hour watch process (OPNAVINST
3120.32B, 1986, pp 4-16 to 4-19). The Officer of the Deck reports to as many as seven
superior officers during the watch: the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer,
Command Duty Officer, Navigator, Tactical Action Officer, and any embarked
Commander and that Commander's Staff Watch Officer Approximately 60 junior
personnel report indirectly to the Officer of the Deck through the six primary personnel
who report directly: the Junior Officer of the Deck, Junior Officer of the Watch, Combat
Information Center Watch Officer, Damage Control Watch Officer, Communications
Watch Officer and the Engineering Officer of the Watch
The hierarchical operating procedures are described on the following pages. With a
hierarchical organizational structure, the more important the information the further down
in the organization a person must go to get it. For example: If the roving Sounding and
Security Watch detected flooding in number one pump room (a normally unmanned
space), he or she would make this flooding report to the Damage Control Watch in
Damage Control (DC) Central This watch stander would take the information and relay
it to the bridge over the 1JV sound-powered phone circuit monitored by the Lee
Helmsman. The Lee Helmsman would make this report to the Junior Officer of the Deck
to relay to the Officer of the Deck for possible corrective action.
Similar communication channels transfer the status of engineering and auxiliary
equipment, fires, sighting of air and surface contacts, electronic emission detection,
personnel casualties, sonar contacts, incoming voice, visual and electronic communications
and a host of other information needed by the Officer of the Deck. The multiple levels
these communications transfer through leaves open the possibility and even probability
that critical information could be altered, misinterpreted, or not even make it through the
complete path up the chain of command.
To assist the Officer of the Deck on the bridge, the Ship's Organization and
Regulations Manual (SORM) provides a host of officer and enlisted watch standers to
perform various functions and relay needed information. The number of bridge watch
standers almost doubles during General Quarters, but during normal peacetime steaming it
consists of 12 watch standers.
A Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) principally assists the OOD in the performance
of his or her duties. Normally filled by newly reported junior officers, this watch stander
becomes familiar with the duties and responsibilities of the OOD in order to later qualify
for that position. On most ships, the JOOD also serves as the Conning Officer, giving the
rudder and steering orders to the Helmsman and engine orders to the Lee Helmsman.
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A Junior Officer of the Watch (JOOW) also becomes familiar with bridge operation to
later qualify as OOD. He or she primarily monitors any guarded bridge tactical
communication circuits, responds to ones directed to the ship and encrypts and decrypts
coded messages with various code books. The JOOW also plots surface contacts to
determine their course, speed, and closest point of approach to the ship, and determines
relative and true wind direction and speed for helicopter operations.
The Quartermaster of the Watch (QMOW) performs routine navigation duties,
plotting the ship's position, course and speed as well as monitoring environmental
conditions. As a qualified helmsman, the QMOW also assists in that watch station's
training and supervision. He or she documents events in the ship's deck log and executes
the ceremonial sunset and sunrise duties.
The Boatswain's Mate of the Watch (BMOW) supervises the bridge enlisted-watch
standers—with the exception of the QMOW, who is supervised by the Navigator. The
BMOW announces the daily routine from reveille to taps over the ship's IMC
communications circuit, and assists the OOD in carrying out the ship's daily routine
The Helmsman, normally a very junior enlisted seaman, steers the ship on the heading
and course ordered by the conning officer and continually monitors the difference between
the ship's gyro heading and magnetic heading in case of loss of the ship's gyrocompass
The Lee Helmsman transmits engine orders from the conning officer to the engine
room via the engine order telegraph, as well as by voice over the 1JV sound-powered
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phone circuit. He or she also monitors the 1 JV circuit for communications from DC
Central.
The Status Board Keeper, also known as the sound-powered phone talker, receives
surface contact information from the Combat Information Center over the 1 JL circuit and
maintains a surface status board displaying all contacts with their updated course, speed
and closest point of approach. He or she also receives reports from the lookouts over the
circuit to relay to the OOD.
The two Lookouts, one forward and one aft, report all visible contacts and objects
through the JL circuit. Considered the eyes of the ship, the Lookouts are sometimes
called the lifebuoy watch. They maintain an alert watch for man overboards and must
have a life ring near their position.
The Messenger of the Watch performs miscellaneous duties for the BMOW, including
cleaning, polishing the bridge's brass, delivering messages, answering telephones, and
waking the watch reliefs from the oncoming watch section. The messenger serves as an
extra bridge watch stander allowing flexibility and the rotation of enlisted watch standers.
While not physically located on the bridge, the After Steering Helmsman monitors the
1 JV phone circuit and as a fully qualified helmsman stands ready to take control of
steering locally in the event of loss of steering control from the bridge. The composition
of this watch varies from ship to ship. On a frigate, one junior enlisted helmsman fills the
watch during peacetime steaming. During General Quarters and other evolutions such as
underway replenishment and entering, or exiting restricted waters, a qualified officer,
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helmsman, electrician, machinist's mate and quartermaster fill the watch (OPNAVINST
3120.32B, 1986,4-37)
C. COMBAT SYSTEMS CONTROL
Organized in a similar hierarchical structure, the Combat Information Center (CIC)
serves as the control area for the tactical employment of offensive weapons and defensive
systems for the ship through the Tactical Action Officer (TAO). OPNAVINST 3 1 20.32B
lists the TAO's one primarv duty as being "responsible for the safe and effective operation
of the combat systems and for any other duties prescribed by the Commanding Officer."
(OPNAVINST 3120 32B, 1986 p. 4-16) He or she reports to the Commanding Officer for
employment of, and any potential problems in, the ship's offensive or defensive combat
capabilities.
While the specific organizational structure varies for each class of surface ship—based
on its mission and combat capabilities—the general manning of CIC involves personnel at
four levels: Command, Coordination, Supervision and Operation The organizational
























































Figure 2 (NWP 65-28, 1988, p. 2-8)
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D. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY: THE NEED
FOR A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
This organizational structure appears outdated when compared to the evolution that
has occurred in private industry. During the 1980s the Navy invested billions on
Information Technology but failed to change the basic way in which work is performed,
supervised and managed. Private industry also faced this hurdle but overcame it. In the
mid-1980s industry's chief executive officers and economists lamented over the billions of
dollars invested in information technology with little gain in productivity, quality, or
profits. That era appears over. "For the first time the computer is an enabler of
productivity improvement rather than a cause of low productivity." (Stewart, 1993, p. 70)
This occurred in the private sector after businesses transformed their way of operating.
Competition forced a transformation similar to the replacement of steam by electricity
The 1 994 DOD Appropriations Act includes over nine billion dollars for the Navy's
Information Technology procurement and maintenance budget. In spite of such a large
portion of its annual budget being dedicated to this area, the Navy continues to operate
much the same as it did over a hundred years ago. By looking for new organizational
structures and new ship designs incorporating technological innovations, and by
eliminating obsolete requirements, the surface Navy may find the same savings in
personnel and gains in productivity experienced by private industry in the recent past
15
E. COMMERCIAL SHIPPING'S SUCCESSFUL
TRANSFORMATION
The commercial shipping industry's search for reducing manpower requirements began
in the late 1960s. Demographic and cultural changes had created a serious maritime
personnel shortage throughout Northwest Europe and Japan. (National Research Council,
1984, p. 29) In the mid-1970s a worldwide recession caused a sharp reduction in
shipping, which ended the manpower shortage and forced attention to improving
operating efficiencies. These two motivators, with competition, forced shipping
companies to continually reduce crew size while improving their ship's productivity
through automation and organizational changes.
Today, the crew of a typical U. S. flag vessel totals 20 to 24 personnel compared with
over 45 crew members 30 years ago. Some highly automated foreign ships operate
routinely with crews of eight or fewer. (National Research Council, 1990, p. vii) Over the
past decade, shipyards built ships capable of operating safely with even fewer onboard
personnel, but current laws, regulatory policies, and labor-management contracts limit
further reductions to below today's levels. (National Research Council, 1990, p. 12)
Commercial shipping companies reduced manpower requirements and improved
productivity through a number of changes. Shipbuilders centralized control of all ship
functions on the bridge, with comprehensive automation of navigation, propulsion control,
cargo operations, safety and emergency systems, as well as external and internal
communications. Companies then eliminated the departmental, hierarchical shipboard
organizational structure and replaced it with a team-based approach to ship operations.
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Fragmented organizations, like that of the Navy's surface fleet, display appalling
diseconomies of scale. The diseconomies show up not in direct labor, but in overhead
If, for instance, an organization does 100 units of work an hour, and each of its
workers can do 10 units an hour, the company would need 1 1 people: 10 workers
and 1 Supervisor. But if demand grew tenfold to 1,000 units of work an hour, the
company wouldn't need just 10 times the number of workers plus one manager for
each 10 new workers. It would need something like 196 people: 100 workers,
10 Supervisors, 1 manager, 3 assistant managers, 18 people in a human resources
organization, 1 9 people in long-range planning, 22 in audit and control, and 23 in
facilitation and expediting.
(Hammer and Champy, 1993, p. 29)
The organizational problems Hammer and Champy found in private industry applies also
to the Navy's surface ships To support the "workers", the enlisted E-l to E-5 personnel
who actually repair, operate or create something, an extensive support system exists
aboard surface ships.
These support personnel provide the six or more levels of supervision, process the
administrative work, cook the meals and provide the counseling. Much like a small town,
each ship operates and maintains a smaller version of a post office, hospital, police force,
fire department, bank, general-merchandise store, restaurants, entertainment facilities and
schools. Today more of the crew provide support than actually perform effective work
These characteristics are not new, but until recently the Navy just did not have to
worry much about them. Higher overhead costs were passed on to the American
taxpayers for payment Without another source of supply for the service provided by the
Navy, the taxpayers had nowhere else to turn The senior Navy leadership managed the
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growth of the Navy's budget with little concern for the rising costs of overhead. Now that
budget growth has been replaced by budget reductions, the overhead matters a great deal.
Navy ships are moving into the twenty-first century with an organizational structure and
operating procedures designed during the nineteenth century to work in the twentieth.
The Navy needs something entirely different.
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III. DETERMINING AND MEETING MANPOWER NEEDS
A. CALCULATION OF MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
The responsibility for policy control and determination of manpower requirements lies
with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training with
support provided by the Navy Manpower and Analysis Center, NAVMAC. NAVMAC
accomplishes its primary mission of developing and documenting manpower requirements
for all Navy fleet activities by collecting man-hour data and generating the Ship Manpower
Document (SMD) (OPNAVINST 1000.16G, 1990, p. 2-3)
Various methods for determining manpower requirements from these data have been
used over the past thirty years. The Manpower Determination Model (MDM), developed
in 1967, generated manning estimates early in the ship design process, using historical fleet
manning data from ships with onboard components similar to those of the proposed ship
The MDM used a data base of 7000 basic modules for various equipment, systems,
subsystems and ship characteristics to compute a total manning package for each
condition of readiness. (Arnold, 1980, p. 57-8). According to the technical director of
the Navy Manpower Analysis Center, the MDM is no longer used (Skaggs, 1994)
The current SMD methodology uses the Navy Manpower Requirements System
(NMRS). NMRS replaced the Computerized Ship Manning Analysis System in April of
1978 and continues to be used today for preliminary and final SMD generation Navy
planners prepare Required Operational Capability documents and Projected Operational
Environment statements (ROC/POE) for each class of Navy ship to serve as a basis for
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determining Navy military manpower requirements. (OPNAVINST 53 10. 18A, 1986, p.
D-5) As a computer-based model, the NMRS computes manning requirements from
workload data measured in man-hours in four major categories: Facilities Maintenance,
Planned Maintenance System, Own Unit Support, and Watch stations. (OPNAVINST
3501. 10B, 1988, C-9)
Manpower planners collect data for each category using a variety of inputs. For
example, watch station man-hour requirements come from the vessel's mission statement
interpreted by specially trained manpower analysts who also consider internal ship
practices, procedural manuals, naval warfare publications, damage control survivability
standards, navy tactical publications and various military instructions. All watch stations
are then applied to a watch station standard and the variance and idiosyncrasies of the
individual ship taken into consideration. The Navy Manpower Analysis Center then
computes billets required using standard allowances and a standard afloat Navy workweek
to determine manning requirements for each condition of readiness. (Skaggs, 1994)
The workload requirements for the other elements are allocated remaining man-hours
from each billet until fulfilled For example, on a particular billet there are 56 hours of
watch applied as a result of underway operations. That leaves eleven hours of remaining
effective time that can be applied to the other three elements from that billet. Allocation
to the four elements is applied from each billet until the billet has 67 hours of effective
work assigned to it Another seven hours for service diversion including— but not limited
to—quarters, inspections, CO's non-judicial punishment, and participation on boards and
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committees along with seven hours for training, complete each billet's workload of 81
hours per week. The latter 14 hours are considered necessary but ineffective time
(OPNAVINST 1000. 16G, 1990, p. 5-16)
NAVMAC uses a series of super PCs, which replaced their mainframe system in July of
1993, to input the manpower requirements collected The computer model divides the
man-hour requirements by the standard Navy workweek of 81 hours and computes the
total number of hours assigned to each divisional work center by rating. The computer
model spreads the individual workload among all determined billets. NAVMAC analysts
then take the computer recommendations and manually adjust the billets and apply needed
corrections to eliminate and consolidate partial billets (Skaggs, 1994)
B. SINS OF OMISSION: SOME FAILURES IN THE PRESENT
METHOD
There are holes in the present methods for determining manpower needs, and these
result in gross inefficiencies and unnecessarily high costs. Some of the things that are not
considered by the SMD process include costs, cost constraints, availability of personnel,
and bunk space limitations
We develop pure pristine requirements that are unconstrained. We assume every
billet that we display is fully trained, qualified and motivated to perform the job in
which it is assigned.
(Skaggs, 1994)
The SMD process does not include time allowances for crisis management, special project
work, personnel management, or the variety of undocumented tasks that shipboard
personnel routinely contend with "The SMDs represent all of the manpower necessary to
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accomplish the documented shipboard workload in an underway steaming environment
without any fiscal, physical, or personnel inventory constraints." (American Management
Systems, 1979, p. 1)
C. AUTHORIZING THE MANPOWER
Furthermore, the Navy determines the appropriate manpower level for each surface
ship by using estimates of the workload requirements, but does not question the
importance of the work itself It then computes the number of personnel to fulfill those
requirements given standard hours available in a workweek. Not only is little, or no
consideration given to changes in the cost ofmanpower and of its substitutes but also the
planners do not reexamine long-fulfilled and obsolete requirements. Requirements set in
tradition and an ever-increasing list of mandated practices cause today's Navy vessels to be
manned with hundreds of personnel, each expected on average to fill the Navy standard
workweek of 81 hours for military personnel afloat (OPNAVINST 1000. 16G, 1990, p.
5-16)
The Ship Manpower Document generated by the Naval Manpower Analysis Center
becomes the basis for a Manpower Authorization (MPA) determined by OPNAV. The
MPA specifies the authorized numbers and rating levels allocated to each ship considering
Navy personnel constraints These authorizations are constrained versions of the Ship
Manpower Document and only here are the monetary limits of the Navy budget, personnel
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availability for ship assignment, and some physical limits such as available living and bunk
space onboard finally reflected
One of the most frequent limiting constraints comes from the personnel inventory,
which is directly related to the Navy's budget limit To manage this problem, OPNAV
created the Navy Manning Plan (NMP) which specifies the "fair share" of the personnel
inventory each ship is entitled to and establishes the general composition of each ship's
crew. These NMPs also serve as the baseline for the assignment, recruiting and detailing
process. (American Management Systems, 1979 p. 2) This share, as determined by the
Enlisted Personnel Management Center, originates from the difference between SMD
rating authorizations and the number available in the Navy's personnel inventory for that
rating.
The goal of the manpower requirements determination and assignment process is to
provide active duty ships with the best practical set of personnel to accomplish their
assigned mission. Personnel shortages, space limitations, fiscal and other constraints make
it infeasible to provide manpower resources to accomplish all of the required workload, as
determined in the SMD process
Looking at the manpower levels specified for the AE and AFS auxiliary ships by their
SMD, authorized, and "fair share" NMP numbers shows a reduction from the number of
personnel required to accomplish the documented workload and the crew size with which
the ships actually operate These numbers are depicted in Table 1 below
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Table 1
MANPOWER / PERSONNEL SPECIFICATIONS
SHIP SMD AUTHORIZED NMP
AE28 373 336(90%) 326(87.4%)
AFS3 403 404(100%) 388(96.3%)
A0145 339 285(84.1%) 277(81.7%)
(American Management Systems, 1979 p. 4)
D. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE MANPOWER "NEEDS" AREN'T
MET?
If the capacity of personnel to accomplish the required workload is less than the
demands of the workload documented by NAVMAC, one or more of the following three
conditions must exist:
- Shipboard personnel are overworked
- Requirements for outside assistance increase
- Required workload does not get accomplished
The first condition is difficult to determine Given a standard Navy workweek of 81
hours, personnel may, on average, exceed this limit due to a variety of factors including
but not limited to: lack of motivation, insufficient training, inadequate supervision, low
skill levels, or a lack of proper tools, materials, documentation and other resources. One
indication of overwork may be seen in retention statistics for first term and career
personnel, with workload increases and overwork resulting in lower retention statistics.
Reenlistment statistics for both groups in the early 1 990s have not shown a lower but
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instead a higher retention level across enlisted personnel ratings over levels experienced in
the previous decade (DOD Military Manpower Statistics, 1991, pp 32-34)
Workload nonaccomplishment and increases in outside assistance are both more easily
determined Data, reports and inspections have not shown an increase in either of these
two areas. "Ships have not indicated an inability to accomplish their mission and
workload requirements with the 87 to 92 percent of the personnel the NMRS determined
are required to accomplish them." (Sovereign, 1994)
Since the requirement statements documented and collected by NAVMAC serve as
the basis for manpower decisions, an incorrect level and number of valid requirements
would make these manpower decisions also incorrect. To address these problems and
recommend improvements, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics sponsored
a program called the Maintenance System Development Program through Naval Sea
Systems Command. One product of this program was development of the Shipboard
Manpower Analysis System (SMAS) by American Management Systems, Inc.
SMAS consisted of two primary subsystems. The first, called the Manpower
Computation Subsystem, computed the manpower necessary to perform all the workload
requirements documented by NAVMAC, considering different steaming conditions in port
as well as at sea The system was designed as an enhancement to the NMRS which
assumed continuous peacetime steaming and its long at-sea work week
The second subsystem in SMAS consisted of the Manning Impact Analysis, which
identified the workload requirements that could not be accomplished feasibly by a
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specified number of onboard personnel. This system demonstrated the extent to which the
documented shipboard workload requirements were beyond the capabilities of the crews
typically aboard Navy ships. (American Management Systems, Inc., 1979, p. 5)
The Shipboard Manpower Analysis System was proposed as a tool to improve the
NMRS by identifying the minimum billets required for different conditions of readiness. It
demonstrated the ability to defer workload requirements to alternate steaming conditions
over the ship's entire operational schedule. "Whatever the potential the system promised,
it isn't used today." (Skaggs, 1994)
This work by American Management Systems is just one of many attempts to improve
manpower determination for the Navy's surface ships through an evolutionary
improvement of the process, without ever looking at the problemfrom a revolutionary
perspective Manpower planners must look for other options, substitutions, or other
organizational structures to achieve the same, or at least an acceptable output. With
advanced technologies and crews of higher skill levels, the basic operating procedures and
organizing principles have become obsolete. Instead of getting these crews to work
harder, the solution may be in learning to work differently.
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IV. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, FISCAL AND PERSONNEL
TRENDS IN DOD THAT DEMAND A NEW APPROACH
A. CHANGES IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Over the last 20 years, information and automation technology changed dramatically
These rapid advances in technical capability have been accompanied by equally rapid
reductions in cost
While many of these technologies could not withstand the rigorous at-sea conditions in
which surface ships operate, commercial shipping companies have proven that many
technologies can be successfully adopted for shipboard use.
There is a striking similarity between the problems experienced by commercial shipping
firms in the 1970s and the current problems in the navy Competition and the rising cost
of manpower forced commercial firms to look for means of reducing shipboard manning
levels and lowering operating costs. A decreasing defense budget is forcing the Navy to
face the same challenge two decades later.
B. NAVY BUDGET REDUCTIONS
The end of the Cold War, election of a new administration and a growing federal
deficit all contributed to the recent decline in the Department of Defense's budget. Table 2
below shows the forthcoming budget by Title in comparison to the previous two years.
"The DoD budget request for FY94 was for $250.7 billion, which amounted to a decline
of 5% in real terms when adjusted for inflation from the budget passed for FY93 and 35%
below the 1985 peak of $350 billion ." (George, 1993, p. 195) The Navy budget cuts
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translated into reductions in active duty personnel, operation and maintenance funds and
reductions in the number of surface vessels.
Table 2




Military Personnel 81.2 76.3 70.1
O&M 93.8 86.4 70.1
Procurement 63.0 53.6 45.5
RDT&E 36.6 38.2 38.6
Military Construction 5.3 4.5 5.8
Family Housing 3.7 3.9 3.8
Revolving Funds 4.6 -2.2 -2.1
All Other -6.37 -1.6 -0.7
GRAND TOTAL 281.9 259.1 2507
(George, 1993, p. 196)
C. NAVY PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS
By 1999, the Navy plans to reduce active duty forces by a total of 1 70,000 enlisted
personnel and 20,000 officers while cutting some 185 ships compared to the Navy of
1989. (Force 2001, 1993, p. 37) Table 3 below shows these cuts in personnel. These
reductions force the Navy to consider alternative methods for performing its at-sea
mission, with the most likely solutions found by transferring what has occurred in the
private sector to the Navy While the merchant fleet's mission differs from the Navy's,
they operate in the same environment with workers from the same population base. Their
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employees have demonstrated an ability to work effectively with sophisticated equipment
and reduced supervision. The Navy should be able to achieve similar results
Table 3
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TRENDS
FY1992 FY 1993 FY1994
DoD Budget S281.9B $259 IB $250.7B
Navy Budget S90.3B $82 5B $76.8B
DoD Manpower 1.808M 1.728M 1.620M
Navy Manpower 541,900 526,400 480,800
X
s.
(George, 1993, pp. 196-8)
D. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMANDS TRANSFORMATION
Military Sealift Command (MSC) overcame similar obstacles as they transformed their
ship operations to more closely match civilian ones MSC began manning and operating
U. S. Navy auxiliary ships in 1972 Since that time, the trend to replacing active-duty
ships with civilian-manned ones has increased in the mission areas of sealift, resupply and
refueling. The MSC ships cost less to operate and provide equal or better service
compared to the active-duty option. (O'Shea, 1994)
A study was commissioned by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics in April of 1983 to examine and compare the manning level
requirements of active duty auxiliary vessels with a civilian manning option Information
29
Systems, a Virginia-based defense contractor, conducted a detailed capability analysis of
the manpower requirements, mission capabilities, operational impacts and costs of civilian
verses military manning options for auxiliary ships. The contractor found that the civilian
manning option was the least costly on an equal capability basis. (Information Spectrum,











(Information Spectrum, 1983, p. iv)
Table 5










(Information Spectrum, 1983, p.v)
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The manning-level decrease and cost reduction shown above occurs primarily from
replacing previously human functions with more efficient and effective technology, and
adjusting their operating practices to take advantage of these new capabilities
The difference between the active duty and MSC manning options would be even
greater if the MSC manpower level were based on the actual output or service required of
the ship and not on a functional analysis of the Navy's Ship Manpower Document (SMD)
To determine the MSC manning level, the Navy requires creation of a "Notional Equal
Capability Crew" based on a functional analysis of the Navy's SMD. (Information
Spectrum, 1983, p. 2-3) By using the SMD, Military Sealift Command is unable to achieve
manpower savings through elimination of obsolete requirements taken from the long list of
sources used for the Navy's manpower determination. To see the potential, one has only
to look at the commercial shipping industry and the direction of private organizations.
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V. DIRECTION OF PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
A. EARLY PREDICTION
Two professors at the Carnegie Institute of Technology published an article in 1958
titled "Management in the 1980s" In it they predicted that the computer would do to
middle management what the Black Death did to 14th-century Europeans. (Leavitt and
Whisler, 1958, p. 44) Evidence supporting the validity of their prediction can be found in
a study conducted by the American Management Association. The study found that
reductions in middle management accounted for 16% of corporate reductions with
demographic forecasts pointing to a continuing trend in layoffs. (Capell, 1992, pp. 44-45)
B. TRADITIONAL VERSES MODERN MANAGEMENT
The traditional line management organization has had a boss who gives orders; an
enforcer in the form of a foreman, who sees that those orders are carried out; and the
workers, who are supposed to do what they are told without asking very much about why.
Over the past 25 years or so—to some extent looking at other cultures, especially Japan,
and modern psychological experiments—many successful firms have moved away from
that traditional view. While the range of variation is substantial, the keys are probably
found in the management-by-objectives style, commonly called Total Quality Leadership
or TQL. These approaches, while substantively trivial, try to make people at all levels part
of the team and provide them with goals that are clearly related to the larger goals of the
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organization. Other key elements ofTQL include having an agreement about what these
goals are, and providing a lot of feedback
During the past decade, successful organizations realized that technological change
was moving faster than their organizations were adapting and as a consequence the
benefits afforded by new technologies were not being fully exploited They sought
strategies that reduced the threatening nature of new technologies and enabled their
executives and workers to employ them more effectively In working out these new
strategies, management sought better insight into how their organization functioned and
how it communicated and achieved objectives.
Both the formal and informal organizational structures affect what people do and how
they do it, their communication and relationships with peers and supervisors "Formal
structures imply rules, while informal structures are real life interpretations of those rules."
(Smith, 1990, p. 14) Formal structure—planned and specified through official
channels—establishes responsibility, authority, and how communication moves through the
organization, a static system The informal structure develops when people work together
and interact over time. The organizational structure of many successful companies
resulted from grouping functions necessary to achieve the organization's objectives
Some desirable attributes of organizational structure:
- Be catalytic in getting the job done in the most
productive manner
- Never be an end in itself, but only a means to achieve
the best possible use of available resources.
- Identify responsibility, decision-making, authority and
performance accountability in a precise manner
- Be simple, flexible and adapt to change (Smith, 1990, p 14)
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This seems to be the direction that business organizations are taking. When all the
problems of measurement are stripped away, we see that trial and error play an important
part in successful management. Successful businesses continuously monitor achievement.
By timely and appropriate revision of goals and strategies, they keep their organizations
competitive.
C. CHANGES FORCING TRANSFORMATION
Many changes forced businesses to adapt in the past decade: new taxes, state and
federal regulations, increased environmental concerns and the move away from traditional
family units, to name just a few. Nearly all firms have felt the impact of rapidly changing
technology. These rapid technological changes required continuous monitoring of major
organizational assets: financial capital, time, resources, inventory and the like. Widening
technological gaps occurred as technological advances occurred faster than they were
assimilated. A responsive, enlightened management and a well-trained work force helps
keep this gap small. (Smith, 1990, p. 29)
One innovation made possible by new technologies was streamlined inventories and
supplies, assisting companies in becoming more cost effective Just-In-Time delivery (JIT)
minimizes cost and effort through production scheduling and inventory control. The
Toyota Motor Company developed the Just-In-Time concept in Japan. Productivity
savings increased profits by balancing the effort and cost of maintaining an adequate
inventory against the expenses and logistics associated with on-time delivery. Wastes and
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costs of production drop due to a reduction in excess inventory Toyota found that
through their new system, needed production materials remained readily available and
quality actually increased due to retaining defective and obsolete inventory Black and
Decker Manufacturing and Motorola recently joined the long list of American companies
implementing the Just-In-Time system in the United States (Smith, 1990, p. 161)
JIT is just one innovation made possible with the evolution in information technology
New abilities in communication, information processing, product designing and inventory
management, as well as a host of other areas, dominate the work environment The
impact of technology remains high as well as the cost of resisting the necessary changes
needed to use it. An organization's size, age, culture and leadership affect the degree to
which new technologies get assimilated. In the mid 1980s older, large organizations
resisted changing their organizational structure and methods of doing business while new,
small businesses embraced more efficient means of achieving their goals. While Sears lost
market share, Wal-Mart and The Gap thrived General Motors has trouble making
world-class cars in America, but Honda doesn't Bethlehem Steel has shrunk to a tenth of
its former size while Nucor and other minimills are performing well (Hammer and
Champy, 1993, p. 24)
D. EXAMPLES FROM PRIVATE INDUSTRY
Business organizations transformed due to information—a dominant
resource—becoming expandable, compressible, substitutable, highly transportable,
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diffusible and sharable. (Smith, 1990, p. 162). A few examples of the changes in
American companies in the past few years:
- Autos . Cost cutting, design changes and quality improvements.
Automakers are less bureaucratic, more flexible, more customer
minded, driven by competition outside the unchanged U. S. firms.
- Electronics . A capital spending boom is raising productivity. One
firm checks production by computer . . . doing the job of 50 engineers.
- Insurance . Records have now been consolidated and computerized.
Agents get instant access to all data and customers get better service.
(Kiplinger, Jan. 21, 1994, pp. 1-3)
- Distribution . A distributor in Pa. saves labor and money through
electronic ordering, invoicing, paying and depositing. . . . catching
on fast, electronic networks of sellers and customers.
- Trucking . A trucking company in Green Bay links sensors in the trucks
to satellites to keep track of location, speed, rpm's and idling time for its
fleet. If drivers meet company goals, they earn yearly bonuses up to
$6000.
- Communications New communication systems save time, travel and
expense Teleconferencing and videoconferencing are replacing face-
to-face meetings in many situations with documents passing back and
forth by fax machines New fax-retrieval systems allow callers to go
through a touch-tone menu and get reports they need . . . sales
material, price lists, etc. (Kiplinger Oct. 29, 1993, pp 1-3)
In these transformed organizations more information is not better but access to it is.
"Exchanging, buying, analyzing, protecting, storing, retrieving and disseminating
information approaches a nationwide preoccupation ." (Smith, 1990, p. 162)
With a hierarchical organizational structure, the more important the information the
further down in the organization a person must go to get it. The workers at the process
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level possess the knowledge of the quality of incoming supplies and outgoing products and
services, and usually have the best ideas for improvement. Successful businesses in the
1980s moved to a flatter, more participative management structure based on the premise
that people possess the necessary leadership ability, mental capacity and desire to work
together on common goals and objectives. Employees throughout the organization
possess the right mix of knowledge, information, power and incentives to have a positive
impact on organizational performance They delegate decision making to the lowest
possible level At this level, the participants know the task better than any other person
and are the best qualified to improve the process by making the decision. This type of
management results in employees supporting what they help create and developing a sense
of accomplishment and ownership.
The President of Trus Joist Corporation found that his company achieved the greatest
productivity gains without investing a single dollar in new equipment or technology but by
letting employees participate in the business with their ideas and enthusiasm. "In our
company the greatest productivity improvements have come when we enlisted the hearts
and minds of our associates on the factory floor." (Minnick, 1986, p. 131)
Businesses created flatter organizations based on a team structure to improve
productivity, reduce overhead and minimize conflict. Using these small work groups
placed a much higher degree of decision-making responsibility and control in the hands of
the people most affected by the decisions Cost savings occur through reduced
monitoring, more efficient use of worker's time and a reduction in the number of inferior
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items produced. "Approximately 200 plants in the U. S. have begun using the
self-managing team concept." (Sims and Dean, 1985, p. 25). Some of the advantages
and drawbacks to using this new team concept were identified by Sims and Dean.
Advantages are :
- Members develop a variety of skills and are encouraged to learn
more about numerous jobs performed by other team members.
- Teams are highly adaptable and flexible.
- Responses to changing conditions and new startups are uniform
because of training.
- Adapting to new processes and equipment is relatively trouble-free
and is exemplified by a "can do" attitude.
Disadvantages are :
- Startup costs can be significant.
- Middle managers in particular feel highly threatened Their unfounded
fear is that teams will reduce their power and influence.
(Sims and Dean, 1985, p. 27)
Business practices of leading companies in the 1980s marked a significant departure
from their traditional modes of operations, with increasing roles accorded to the
capabilities and opportunities offered by information technology. The most successful
transformations occurred in organizations that recognized and understood benefits from
IT come only with fundamental changes in strategic choices, internal processes, worker
relationships and responsibilities. For organizations in the competitive world of modern
business, the environment of work suddenly changed. Trade periodicals and journals tell
of the transformations hundreds of companies made in order to remain competitive in this
new world of technology
General Electric plant workers set production schedules 50% higher than management
had previously set Shenandoah Life Insurance Company's employee-to-supervisor ratio
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changed from 7-to-l to almost 37-to-l, while service improved and complaints due to
errors declined At Digital Equipment's plant in Enfield, Connecticut, workers eliminated
supervisory positions. Ford's plant in Hermosillo, Mexico blends all assembly workers
into one job classification, with each person responsible for his or her own quality control
and equipment maintenance. (Sherwood, 1988, p. 5-6)
E. CHANGING WORK PROCESSES WITH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY
These organizations succeeded in accommodating the design of their IT system to
match employee skill level, and in transforming the organizational structure to achieve the
most productivity for any given input Decentralized decision making, continuous
learning, challenging jobs and more responsibilities with attractive and challenging career
paths provided new motivation to employees. The results are remarkable.
Private companies now find themselves able to provide better products and services
with vastly fewer people Volkswagen needs only two-thirds of its present work force to
manufacture automobiles. With its sales volume rising, Proctor & Gamble dismissed 12%
of its employees. CIGNA Reinsurance cut its work force by 25% since 1990 (Stewart,
1993, p 66) With the aid of technology, leading organizations transformed from the
command-and-control hierarchy they adopted from the military over 100 years ago These
companies became information-based organizations with specialists directing and
monitoring their own performance through feedback from other workers, customers,
suppliers and sometimes even corporate headquarters "Employment is moving fast from
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manual and clerical workers to knowledge workers who resist the command-and-control
model." (Drucker, 1988, p. 3) With new technology, the need for layers of management
to advise, coordinate and counsel decreases dramatically, and productivity improves. The
head of General Electric's Lighting division, John Opie, explained the impact on his
organization with this statement: "There are just two people between me and a salesman.
Information Technology replaced the rest." (Stewart, 1993, p. 72) Thomas Stewart, in
"Welcome to the Revolution," explained: "The fall of hierarchy frees the man in the gray
flannel suit from his office, his boss, his boss's boss, his boss's boss's boss - not to mention
the suit." (Stewart, 1993, p. 70)
As the nation's largest utility with local telephone systems from Maine to Hawaii, GTE
Corporation is among reengineering's most prominent converts. Workers who once
fielded complaints from angry customers passing them on to repair technicians can now
attempt to resolve problems themselves with the customer still on the line. Performing
remote tests on customer telephone lines corrects problems much faster, reduces the need
to send expensive repair technicians on house calls, and makes the job more interesting.
(Levinson, 1994, p. 49)
As private companies implemented new information systems, they found that
achieving the full benefits of information technology requires transforming the structure of
organizations from the traditional hierarchical form to a flatter, more participative
relationship Researchers conducted various studies on the implementation of new
technology and organizational change in the past decade. The Massachusetts Institute of
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Technology sponsored one such study on the automobile industry through its International
Motor Vehicle Program Researchers gathered data from one Honda plant in Ohio, a
Nissan plant in Tennessee, two General Motors plants in Massachusetts and Michigan, and
a joint venture with a General Motors and Toyota plant in California called NUMMI The
five automobile assembly plants studied by the researchers varied in the amount of
technological and organizational change implemented as they responded to increasing
competition.
The organizational transformations took the form of changes designed to encourage
employee commitment and participation and improve competence They achieved this
through flexible assignments, multiple skill training, self supervision, worker quality
improvement, problem-solving teams, and other participative mechanisms. With a
variance in the degree of technological innovations and organizational reform, the
researchers studied changes in the productivity and quality improvement with startling
conclusions
Advanced technology by itself fails to achieve performance gains. Only when
innovation in work organization accompanies technological innovation do we see
significant performance advantages.
(Krafic and Womack, 1986, p. 7)
These researchers found the same conclusion when studying advanced technology and
work organizations as researchers found studying the introduction of electricity and work
organizations in 1919.
Private industry moved fast from manual and clerical workers to knowledge workers
Information-based organizational structures replaced the command-and-control models
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that business had adopted from the military (Drucker, 1988, p. 3) Information technology
demanded the shift through competition.
The surface Navy can learn by taking a business perspective in integrating information
technology in the evolution to smaller, more capable, less manpower-intensive surface
ships. In the 1980s private companies realized their poor performance when compared to
the competition and changed their operations to take advantage of new technologies in
order to remain profitable. The Navy may find it can emulate those organizations which
reengineered their work processes and achieve similar spectacular results.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR NAVAL SURFACE SHIPS
After over two hundred years of evolutionary changes in surface ships operation and
organization, the time has come to reevaluate the system, retire the old principles and
create a new, revolutionary set The United States needs surface units organized and
designed specifically to operate in today's world, using today's technologies— not historic
structures carried over from earlier, glamorous but no longer relevant times The
Commander of Military Sealift Command gave his perspective on the problem in a speech
in March of 1994
MSC is one of the only areas of DoD where allocations are actually increasing and
why is that? We operate closer to the real world where there's just three commod-
ities: time, money and people. We're expected to operate lean, right and awfully
damn quick. Samuel Johnson said it best: "The prospect of hanging tends to sharpen
the mind." The key's not working harder We're thinking harder and finding the
payback is about five to one.
(VADM Kalleres, 1994)
Over time the Navy has created an enormous bureaucracy ashore as well as on its
ships at sea. To attain predictable, uniform actions from their subordinates, superiors
created formal operating procedures with an organizational structure and feedback
mechanisms needed to carry them out The Navy created an instruction for virtually every
contingency, with lines of authority, responsibility and reporting clearly drawn.
With fleet-wide application of these thousands of procedural requirements, as well as
those generated internally on each ship, the overhead work and increasing administrative
burden now place those who work at sea at a crossroads. Today's decreasing budget and
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increasing mission objectives force radical change—searching for new ways of getting
work accomplished with minimal interference, emphasizing results and not procedures.
(Osborne, 1994, p. 15) As important as they are, it is clear that procedure-based activities
are the wave of the past. The wave of the future is applying information technology to
goal-based activities. (Sprague and McNurlin, 1993, p. 18) This would mean telling the
surface ships what goals they are to accomplish and allowing the workers at the process
level to determine how best to meet those goals.
The Chief ofNaval Operations understands this as one of the surface Navy's current
problems and in July of 1994 explained it as follows:
The Navy's got all these groups working for one purpose: their own. Somewhere
in the Navy is an office with a plate on the door called Asbestos Removal and they're
putting out instructions and requirements to the fleet. Somewhere else, working just
as hard, is another group putting out instructions and guidelines on Physical Readiness.
The list goes on and on. Pick a topic and there's probably some instruction on it.
Now these groups don't talk to each other and why should they, but when their
instructions get down to the process level, these things come together where today
we've got sailors doing a lot more overhead instead of the work they were trained to do
(Admiral Jeremy M Borda, 1994)
A. REENGINEERING THE WORK OF SURFACE SHIPS
In their book, Reengineering the Corporation, Michael Hammer and James Champy
tout "reengineering" as the tool for radical change, with the enabling role of information
technology at its heart. They define reengineering as "the fundamental rethinking and
radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical,
contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service and speed."
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(Hammer and Champy, 1993, p. 32) In their concept, old titles and organizational
arrangements by department, division and work center cease to matter "They are
artifacts of another age " What matters is how work needs to be organized today, given
the demands of today's problems, talents of today's workers and the power of today's
technologies (Hammer and Champy, 1993, p. 2)
As surface ships reengineer their work, the crew's job evolves from narrow,
task-oriented assignments to multidimensional responsibilities Sailors who once followed
orders now make choices and decisions on their own instead Officers and chiefs stop
being supervisors and become facilitators. Sailors then focus more on the needs of the job
and less on the needs of their superiors
Information technology plays the crucial role of enabler in the process What was
once impossible is today practical given the evolution in computer technology Navy
surface ship planners realized the benefits of new technologies and installed high
technology weapon systems, engineering machinery controls and other equipment
throughout surface vessels. These ships fail to achieve the full benefits of these new
systems by not changing the nature of how the crew operates with them
B. NEW TECHNOLOGY, OLD PROCEDURES
The Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class ship uses more than 1200 standard electronic
modules in its engineering machinery control system. Six microcomputers monitor and
control onboard equipment, with each device polled twice per second through a
sophisticated multiplexing system. The network allows passage of millions of bits of
data each second
(Preisel, 1988, p. 121-2)
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Despite these advances, sailors continue to take manual readings and store the data on
paper log books with engineering chiefs and officers reviewing the unprocessed data.
Humans can never achieve the speed, reliability and efficiency of a computer-based
application to perform the task. Computers could look for trends. Have oil temperature,
or vibrations increased? Has the output of a pump decreased compared to its designed
head/flow curve? What is the acceptable degradation before repairs are required and the
projected time to individual component and total system failure. "Processing this data
should be left to a computer and interpretation of the information should be left to the
engineer." (Preisel, 1988, p. 124)
Damage control encompasses another shipboard mission area with potential manpower
savings and productivity increases. Aboard even the newest surface ships, the
damage-control process requires the crew to:
1 Fill out paper message forms reporting emergencies;
The forms are then sent by runner to Damage Control
Central
2 Identify compartments adjacent to the site of emergency
to be sealed.
3. Notify the Officer of the Deck and Commanding Officer, as
well as other officers and senior enlisted personnel.
(OPNAVINST3120.32B, 1986)
Even with a well-trained and battle-ready crew, the communication process becomes
dangerously complex, exponentially so in a multiple crisis scenario.
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In 1993 the CAE-Link Corporation developed a Shipboard Monitoring and Control
System (SMCS) for the Naval Sea Systems Command One element, the Battle Damage
Control section, significantly reduces the time to report and analyze shipboard damage
with dramatic increases in accuracy when compared to the manual method (Walsh, 1993,
p. 37) The current version of SMCS continues to rely on manual input of damage control
symbology by operators using a computer mouse. The technology exists to link the
system to remote sensing devices installed throughout the ship, monitoring temperature,
pressure, humidity and particulate matter to generate real-time condition reports,
eliminating the need for human operators.
C. NAVIGATING IN A NEW WAY
The introduction of new technological equipment changed the way commercial
shipping interests now operate ship control and navigation, and may provide the surface
Navy with similar productivity gains and cost savings for bridge operations A symposium
of maritime interests held a convention in London during the fall of 1992 Three hundred
delegates from twenty countries considered the following proposition: "This house
believes that safe and efficient transport no longer requires paper charts and maps."
(Walters, 1993, p. 203) The fact that a majority of the delegates rejected the proposal is
not surprising, considering that they represented the world's navies and not commercial
shipping industries Manpower costs directly affect the profitability of commercial
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organizations, explaining their motivation to begin replacing personnel with more effective
and efficient electronic equipment over a decade ago.
Perhaps paper charts and manual methods should not be discarded completely. Just as
the Navy keeps the sextant and magnetic compass to back up satellite navigation and the
gyrocompass, the Navy should adopt the electronic counterpart of the paper chart for
navigation. Sperry Marine's Voyage Management System satisfies all international
guidelines for "one man bridge" operation. (Sperry, 1990, p. 2) The NAVSIT module
provides a real-time display of the ship's current position on a uniform, accurate,
up-to-date electronic chart. As the ship transits, the next chart is automatically displayed
with the ship's position plotted. Unlike the paper chart, Sperry's product offers autopilot,
collision avoidance, route planning, replay capabilities, and route storage for future
transits, as well as a host of other capabilities Commercial shipping companies routinely
operate their vessels equipped with these systems and one watch stander on the bridge.
(Sperry, 1990, pp. 2-5)
D. NEW MISSIONS FOR TODAY'S NAVY
With a revolutionary perspective, commercial shipping companies changed the nature
of their work in response to new technologies. Following the dramatic changes regarding
the former Soviet threat, one thing remains clear: The size of the Navy will become
smaller, and the mission of the Navy broader. "Today there're 43 countries that may need
our help and a lot of that need is nontraditional." (VADM Kalleres, 1994) Reviewing the
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following operations the Navy has recently engaged in provides some sense of the
expanding roles being faced today.
Table 6
RECENT MAJOR OPERATIONS
Drug Operations Caribbean 1989 - Present
Maritime Intercept Persian Gulf 1990-- Present
Provide Comfort Turkey / Iraq 1991 - Present
Haitian Refugees Guantanamo 1991 - Present
Provide Relief Kenya 1992- Present
Maritime Monitor Yugoslavia 1992- - Present
Hurricane Andrew Florida 1992
Hurricane Iniki Hawaii 1992
Typhoon Omar Guam 1992
Southern Watch Iraq 1992- • Present
Restore Hope Somalia 1992- Present
(Force 2001, 1993, pp. 12-17)
Ships no longer spend their time at sea conducting large-scale antisubmarine warfare
exercises and Naval gunfire support training "Today's exercises are indistinguishable
from the real thing and the boundaries between training and peacetime operations are
often ambiguous ." (Force 2001, 1 993, p 8) If the Navy approaches these new, broader
missions classically, using current methods and an obsolete perspective, it may not
succeed VADM Kalleres described the preparation for the Restore Hope operation this
way:
49
Getting ready for Somalia wasn't dull. That's for sure. At first we approached
that mission classically, just like it was another Desert Storm People pulled out their
manuals and started loading artillery. They weren't thinking ahead. Too many
paradigms in the way. Somalia was a different problem.
(VADM Kalleres, 1994)
These problems may be overcome by taking a revolutionary look at how our ships are
designed and operated. Forgetting what the Navy has today, what would a new ship look
like? How would it perform its mission? What kind of support would it need, and what
size crew would sail on it?
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VII. A NEW SHIP DESIGN CONCEPT BASED ON CURRENTLY
AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY
We must structure a fundamentally different naval force to respond to strategic
demands ... Our goal is to focus our procurement strategy on systems that best
support the unique capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps.
( FROM THE SEA , 1992, pp. 1-2)
Responding to the new direction set forth by the Secretary of the Navy requires a new
approach to the way the surface Navy fulfills its at-sea mission. The Navy must build
ships with automation in mind from the initial design phase It must eliminate the need to
fulfill the long list of shipbuilding requirements and have a simpler goal: to provide the
Navy with an affordable ship that is rigorous and combat-capable, while being easy to
operate, maintain and engage in battle with a smaller crew One way to attain these
simpler goals combines automation and manpower issues early in the ship design process
and addresses the tradeoffs
This means building new ships around a high-performance, distributed computing
system with multiple access and backup capabilities to achieve optimum, efficient
manpower and automation levels.
Currently available technology allows for the reduction in manpower requirements
through automation, resulting in even more reliable, efficient and cost-effective systems
than we currently have at sea today. After an over 200-year traditional way of operating,
many paradigms obscure this new ship design. Starting from a blank conceptual base with
no requirements other than those stated above, many ideas come to mind Clearly it
makes sense to design the ship first and then tailor a new organizational structure to most
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effectively fight, operate and maintain the ship in its at-sea mission The installation of
automated systems would increase the up-front construction costs but reduce the ship's







Projected Lifecycle Cost Curve
Figure 3
The Chief ofNaval Operations stated his idea on the issue in July of 1994 in a speech
in Monterey, California at the Naval Postgraduate School
Shortly after I took over in April I began asking some questions. I've got something
called the CNO Executive Panel and asked them to look at a new concept: What if
we design our next ship revolutionary instead of evolutionary? Forgetting what they
look like and how they operate today, what would this new ship look like? It's an
interesting question (Admiral Jeremy M Boorda, 1994)
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A. SHIP CONTROL
Considering currently available technology and the potential manpower savings, many
ideas come to mind for designing an evolutionary surface ship Imagine a new ship where
the Navy has combined the Bridge and Combat Information Center into one internal,
hardened Command Center with external and internal viewing capabilities. Further
imagine large visual display screens allowing for 360-degree external views from the ship
and selected internal displays of critical combat and operational spaces Linking these
displays to combat sensor equipment allows for selection of air search, surface search,
sonar, infrared, night vision, or visual modes from which the two watch standers monitor
the tactical picture. An automated navigational system based on GPS satellites allows for
ship fixes within two to four meters of actual position. (Walters, 1993, p. 203) Routing
that constantly updated information to fire control systems, ship control (autopilot) and
even engineering equipment provides more effective use of the information
Seasoned mariners feel a need to be part of the external environment for safety
reasons. Contrary to that perception, a study by the U. S. Coast Guard found that 88%
of marine casualties occur in clear weather, with the other ship plainly in sight, and with
communications well established. "Despite their experience and expertise, mariners have
never seen, or felt all of the infinite and constantly changing conditions, and situations that
occur at sea." (Gates, 1989, p. 2-3)
Currently available commercial marine products monitor the ship's speed and position,
and the relative and true wind conditions It is technologically possible to share this
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information with the ship's self-defense systems. These now integrated systems could
detect an inbound missile, automatically turn the ship in the direction of safe water, launch
heat or aluminum chaff decoys, and recommend countermeasures.
B. ENGINEERING CONTROL
With a similar design Main Control could monitor main engineering and auxiliary
spaces and serve as a back-up hot site from which to control and fight the ship if the
primary command center were destroyed. With a modern ship equipped with sensors and
automatic control devices, with multiple readings fed to multiple systems, engineering
watch stations reduce from 15 to three people. With control devices and data from the
navigational system, garbage, oil and CHT (sewage) equipment could be set to discharge
automatically but only when outside international limits from shore with manual overrides
in case of emergency.
Main Control could also monitor each space for temperature, humidity, and airborne
particulate matter, and route that information to a database for log-keeping, an air
conditioning system for environmental control, and a damage-control system for automatic
fire suppression and battle-damage displays. Except for Main Control, all propulsion and
auxiliary system spaces operate unmanned. By automated monitoring and control
mechanisms, adjustments to the propulsion system based off seawater injection
temperature allows for more efficient operation of the engineering plant. Tank level
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indicators and pumps adjust fuel oil, lubrication oil and freshwater tanks to achieve
automatic feed and enhance ship stability and fuel savings.
C. DAMAGE CONTROL
Equipping the ship externally with chemical, biological and radiological sensors allows
automatic closing of air intakes and activation of water wash-down systems Fire and
flooding sensors installed in each space feed data to a ship schematic display enabling
damage-control personnel to take corrective action. Armored plating serves to shield
critical ship control and engineering spaces with backup life support systems in the event
of attack. Electronic wall displays receive the status of each shipboard space with the
X-ray, Yoke and Zebra status constantly displayed.
Material Conditions of Readiness
X-ray: set during working hours in port by divisional damage-control
petty officers, provides the least protection, the least degree of
watertight integrity; closed even when the ship is not in danger
of attack; must be logged open in the closure log; set only in
secure harbors and naval facilities. All fittings marked XRAY (X)
are closed at all times except when actually in use.
Yoke: Normal peacetime in port and underway cruising condition All
fittings marked "X" and "Y" are closed at all times except when
actually in use
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Zebra: Set during peacetime emergency evolutions and wartime battle
stations. All fittings marked "X", "Y" and "Z" are closed. They
are opened only after receipt of permission from Damage Control
Central.
(Bissell, Oertel et al, 1976, pp. 26-31)
A battle damage-control system built on the CAE-Link Corporation's concept of
protection automation monitors shipboard spaces for hazardous conditions. (Walsh, 1993,
p. 37) With this concept of unmanned propulsion and auxiliary equipment spaces, the
probability of fires falls significantly if the spaces operated are sealed and over-pressured
with inert nitrogen gas. In the event of fire detection from increases in heat or in airborne
particulate matter, the system activates a warning strobe and alarm for personnel
evacuation along floor escape lighting, similar to those used onboard commercial aircraft.
After a 30-second delay, the system seals the space and floods it with Halon gas to
suppress the fire. Similarly, flooding sensors and alarms monitor bilge water levels
activating float-controlled bilge pumps for deflooding.
Because of electronic monitoring and automatic activation of damage-control
equipment, the system's memory banks serve as a "black box," similar to the commercial
airline industry's flight data recorder The capability of recovering final audio crew
tapings and critical equipment readings after a shipboard incident allows investigators to
learn more from maritime disasters. Additionally, the knowledge of the events leading to
an onboard disaster assists Navy planners in the prevention of future incidents.
56
D. MAINTENANCE
By sensing, monitoring and recording operational parameters of equipment, their true
condition could be determined, trends detected and optimum settings made for more
efficient operating and servicing of the equipment. The Navy could move from the
time-based Planned Maintenance System (PMS) to a condition-based one, servicing
equipment only when needed. A database of equipment readings logged by a computer
system would be more reliable than today's paper-based logs, easier analyzed and more
useful to designers, contractors and maintenance personnel working on these systems
Technical manuals and schematics on computer disk instead of paper optimizes space
savings and weight reductions while providing a host of useful capabilities not achieved
with paper-based technical manuals New disk-based information retrieval systems allow
for easier, faster searches and more useful displays of needed information. Maintenance
personnel could retrieve needed data at the system or component level displaying the
impact of corrective actions on linked systems throughout the ship With access to
audiovisual communications, shore-based technicians could work on problems beyond the
scope and skill level of the ship's crew, and could assist with repairs through their view of
the actual equipment—eliminating much of the need for the costly travel to ships which are
in need of technical assistance.
E. SUPPLY
With much of today's inventory control using the bar-coded Navy Stock Number
(NSN), current procedures could be taken further to virtually eliminate the need for an
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afloat supply department on Navy ships. When a part or item is pulled from the onboard
supply by the actual personnel needing the item, the system automatically updates the
onboard database. Daily transmission of the changes to the onboard supply allows
shore-based systems to prepare needed materials for shipment when the onboard supply
falls below preset minimums. With more frequent consumption information, shore-based
supply depots and commercial suppliers now possess the capability to institute the
growing commercial practice of Just-In-Time delivery. With these shore-support
organizations monitoring the changes in the consumption rate of supplies for individual
ships and the entire fleet, they can work with DoD contractors to adjust manufacturing
before shortages appear and decrease production for materials at surplus levels
F. HABITABILITY
The damage-control system monitoring space conditions, when linked to the
hospitality services of air conditioning and heating, allows space temperatures and lighting
kept at optimum settings based on manned or unmanned status. The limited crew size
allows for individual berthing compartments with space for entertainment, training and
education. Without a large crew, the dining facilities may now operate similar to
commercial shipping vessels. Menus can be created based on choice and prepared by
rotating onboard workers, increasing the variety of meals and eliminating the need for
shipboard cooks.
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G. PERSONNEL, DISBURSING, POSTAL, ADMINISTRATION
OFFICES
Current communication capabilities allows transfer of most of these functions to shore
stations with access and update capabilities from sea The now smaller crew demands less
of these functions. A highly trained and educated crew possesses the capability to
maintain their own personnel records when at sea, cash their own checks if needed,
conduct the ships daily routine and send and receive their own mail without enlisted
specialists
H. SECURITY
The intelligence commands in Washington currently use a system easily adaptable to
shipboard applications Their security systems control access to various spaces to
authorized personnel, based on an access list matched to the security clearance and need
for entry. It automatically logs the time of entrance and exit as well as keeping an updated
database of all personnel's current location within the facility (Adams, 1993, p. 33)
As done in private companies, personal code numbers and smart cards eliminate the
need for a quarter-deck watch and maintains a more accurate, detailed log of entries and
exits for monitoring. The personal codes and smart cards also control access to critical
internal spaces and computer equipment.
I. COMMUNICATION
For external communication requirements, a radio message traffic system based on
E-mail delivers communications to the ship with automatic routing to the intended
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recipient. Bridge-to-Bridge radio capability would be enhanced by stored tape recordings
of standard warnings of danger for live at-sea gunfire exercises and threatening maneuvers
in the dominant languages in the operating area. For internal communications, personal
communicators eliminate the need for a public address system and can be enhanced to
monitor physical location, radiation doses, biological signs and other personal data
readings.
J. TRAINING
New Personal Qualification Standards designed around a computer system for
teaching and testing enhances crew learning at a self-pace. With one level completed
satisfactorily, the crew member moves to the next training level with the system tracking
progress for advancement and new watch station qualifications.
By adding simulator capability in the Command Center and Engineering Control, the
crew could train using the actual equipment. When in port, the more junior and
inexperienced officers and crew can run maneuvering or casualty control drills—and see
the results of their action—without damaging the ship.
Educational services via satellite or disk from Navy classroom lectures or civilian
training facilities allow the crew to increase their education and training without the cost
of travel and lost work time away from the ship.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Faced with better adapted competitors, private companies realized their poor
performance and need to integrate information technology into their business process
through radical change. Instead of operating their organization by departments and
functions, they examined their operations from a new perspective by process They
focused on the value-added outcome of each process—why a task was performed, not how
it was done—and how it related to other processes in the organization Private companies
found that continually questioning assumptions and requirements of what needs to be
accomplished and by which method yielded impressive insights
The benefits of using new technologies at first evaded the most progressive
companies. They found new systems could speed up existing work steps without
eliminating the causes behind poor performance. If the outcome of current procedures
yielded an unnecessary result, the new systems would generate the same unnecessary
result more frequently. If unnecessary work steps were performed, they were still
performed, but much faster. If unnecessary information were generated, the same
information was generated in even greater detail. If workers derailed a process requiring
management intervention, they created the same problems more frequently and more
profoundly.
Research has shown that work is rarely improved immediately with the introduction of
new technologies. In a study of 300 firms, researchers found that failure to change the
organization was the largest obstacle in the efficient application of information technology.
(Schnitt, 1993, p. 16) Competition and the threat of bankruptcy forced private
organizations to modify their operations and undertake radical change Today "computers
are finally being used to change the very nature of work, not just do it faster." (Levinson,
1994, p. 49) The surface Navy should learn from the experiences of these private
organizations.
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In, "Permanent Whitewater," Vaill described the destiny of organizations that fail to
adapt to new technology, capabilities and the changing patterns of work. (Vaill, 1990,
pp. 28-29 ) He assumes free-market competition. The surface Navy will survive, but as
the Navy's budget decreases, functions not directly related to combat will increasingly be
transferred to better adapted organizations
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